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John H. Herz: realism and the 
fragility of the international order
P E T E R  S T I R K *
Abstract. John H. Herz is a significant, but comparatively neglected, figure in the development
of International Relations (IR) as a discipline. Although he contributed to the emergence of
realism as the dominant approach to international relations in the United States, his thought
is characterised by an insight into the fragility of the international order and the state which
stands in marked contrast to the emphasis upon durability and persistence evident in recent
surveys of a self-avowed American realism.
There has been a welcome increase in the discrimination with which the develop-
ment of ideas about international order and disorder have been treated. We now
have long-range surveys of political theories of international relations, accounts of
the prewar origins of American ideas about the international order, and accounts of
the vicissitudes of international law.1 The neat but deceptive narratives of the clash
of paradigms has come under sustained criticism.2 There has been increased interest
in the non-Anglo-Saxon sources of IR theory, though this is still comparatively
undeveloped, save for the case of Hans Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt.3 One figure
who has escaped much attention is John Herz, though like Morgenthau he was an
exile from Germany who played a significant role in the development of IR theory in
the postwar United States. His model of the security dilemma is regularly cited in
textbooks and his work is still invoked as an archetypal and pioneering expression of
classical realism.4
Revisiting a significant but comparatively neglected figure in the development of
IR theory is worthwhile in its own right, especially since the full range of his work is
less well known than International Politics in the Atomic Age and Political Realism
and Political Idealism. Indeed Herz’s first book was a pioneering assessment of Nazi
international law, written under the pseudonym of Eduard Bristler in order to
protect his family in Germany.5 There is, however, a much more important reason
for reconsidering Herz. In a recent Forum in the Review of International Studies
Richard Little has compared modern American realist doctrines, the English School
and the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, arguing for strong similarities between
the latter two, including a much greater sense of the fragility of the structure of the
international order taken to lie at the heart of the realist vision.6 Others have taken a
less charitable view of Morgenthau, seeing him, along with George F. Kennan, as
strikingly indifferent to the epochal significance of the Holocaust and have seen this
as a major failure to live up to the realist claim to be responding to the unprecedented
and violent phenomena of international life.7 Behind both sets of arguments lies a
common sense that at least certain kinds of realism too readily presume as unproble-
matic what stands in need of explanation, even when faced with dramatic challenges
to our understanding of the order and norms of international life.
Any discussion of realism as a theory is bound to be faced with the problem that
there are now so many different ‘realisms’. Alongside the arguably predominant
contrast between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ realism, there are self-professed ‘neo-
classical’ realists, ‘contingent’ realists, ‘specific’ realists and ‘generalist’ realists.8 The
sheer diversity of realism and the adaptations that have been made to realism have
led some to question how much of this work still counts as realism, while others
have entered a plea to ‘add up what we all have in common’, and some have stressed
the virtues of debate within particular paradigms.9 It will clearly not be possible here
to indicate Herz’s position with respect to all of these ‘realisms’. It is possible and
necessary to indicate how Herz’s ideas relate to the contrasting assumptions and
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policy strategies of defensive and offensive realism. Differences within the realist
camp do matter and matter a great deal. As will be shown below, however, it is an
awareness of the fragility of the international order and the challenges to it that
ultimately marks out Herz’s brand of realism. As has been said of E.H. Carr, Herz
was someone ‘who asked how that order had come about, how it had changed over
time, and ultimately how it might be transcended’, but his optimism about the latter
possibility was never more than guarded, kept in check by the persistence of the
security dilemma for which he became famous.10
It is no accident that he chose as the title of his autobiography Vom Überleben (Of
Survival).11 There is, of course, a simple biographical logic to that choice. As a
German Jew born in 1908 his own personal survival had been under threat. Yet it
also reflects other factors. Herz’s intellectual concerns were shaped by the short
twentieth century in which survival for individuals, states and the species was
constantly threatened. Furthermore, although Herz made his name as an advocate
of realism within American political science, the European origins of his ideas
continued to affect the way he understood key concepts and his underlying approach
to the international order. There was a resonance of a clash of cultures in a review
of the state of the discipline in the early 1970s. There Herz expressed his reservations
about quantitative approaches to international politics and recalled a seminar in the
1930s attended by Quincy Wright ‘where his chiefly European students, although
greatly impressed by his data, were flabbergasted by the unsophisticated use of
historical and cultural variables’.12 Nor need the difference assume such stark form.
As Richard Little has pointed out there is a certain kind of realism, prominent in
American IR, that assumes ‘that anarchy is a robust structure that does not need to
be explained’.13 Here, Herz’s position is not straightforward. Herz had contributed
to the formation of key elements of this kind of realism, notably through the idea of
the ‘security dilemma’, but, towards the end of his career, came to believe that ‘we
“realists”’ had overlooked the contingency of the balance of power.14 Moreover, as
will be shown below, his realism of the 1940s and 1950s was marked by a sense of
nostalgia for a balance of power now rendered obsolete by bipolarity and, more
importantly, by the atomic age. It is striking here that although Herz asserted the
compatibility of his approach with that of Waltz, the two theorists came to radically
different judgements about the virtues of the bipolar world. Whereas Waltz saw
enhanced predictability, Herz saw enhanced uncertainty.15 When Herz came to
believe that ‘we “realists”’ had been wrong it was in underestimating the precarious-
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References to Herz’s judgement are given below.
ness and violence of a previous age not the present one.16 Yet Herz did share with
Waltz the idea the states sought security. Mearesheimer’s assertion that the doctrine
of offensive realism can be read out of Herz’s view of the security dilemma
systematically misrepresents Herz’s view of the security dilemma and the policy
recommendations he drew from it.17
That sense of precariousness was also evident in Herz’s estimation of the
normative dimension of the international order. From the perspective of the early
1980s Herz aligned his realism with that of Morgenthau and Kennan against the
‘“legalism” and “moralism”, wishful thinking which, in the 1920s and 1930s, and
especially in the United States, had passed for study of international relations’.18
This would seem to align him also with that form of ‘American realism’ that
contends that ‘norms are at best marginal in relations among states’.19 Again this
would be a partial, and ultimately misleading judgement. Herz, a self-avowed
relativist, had been a pupil of Kelsen and, for all his subsequent criticism of the
theory of pure law, retained an interest in the normative dimension of the inter-
national order. It was, however, a fragile order, contingent upon the behaviour of
states, threatened by global trends, but nevertheless of importance. Herz, like
Morgenthau, cannot be seen as a straightforward antecedent of contemporary
American realism. His stress on the fragility and uncertainty of the international
order fits ill with the assumptions about the durability and predictability of the
international order evident in much of contemporary American realism. Insofar as
the latter lays claim to Herz as part of a long-standing and deep-rooted realist
tradition, it may be missing Herz’s most perceptive insights.
From Köln to Geneva and America
Hans Kelsen and the pure theory of law
It was Kelsen’s apparent solution to the problem of ethical relativism that first
attracted Herz. In his autobiography Herz recalled that Kelsen seemed to offer a way
out from the confusion of competing justifications of the state. He provided a way
of dealing with the law and the state as a ‘personified legal order’ which brought
‘clarity to the age-old problem of the relationship between law and ethics’.20 Yet,
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from the outset Herz maintained a certain independence from Kelsen. Amongst the
factors that may have contributed to that autonomy was Herz’s choice of dissert-
ation topic, namely the question of the identity of the state in cases of revolution
and territorial change. From the outset it was the fragility of the legal order that
interested him.21
In further essays in the 1930s Herz continued to question Kelsen’s theory and to
try to break down some of the sharp distinctions drawn within the pure theory of
law. Thus, he turned to the ontology of Nicolai Hartmann in an attempt to work out
how one ought to understand what he called the ‘lesser ideality’ of law, that is how,
on the one hand, its normative character sets it apart from empirical reality and, on
the other, the fact that legal norms do not have the same kind of validity as
mathematical or logical truths. According to Herz the answer lay in recognising that
while the legal norm claimed objective validity, like a work of art it has to be created
at some specific point, and can lose its validity just as the aesthetic values embodied
in the work of art can disappear with the material substratum through which alone
they can exist.22 What matters here is less the validity of Herz’s argument than what
it tells us about his underlying attitude towards law. He did not want to reduce law
to an expression of ‘legal consciousness’, let alone emotions of revenge and the like.
He did want to insist on the objective validity of legal norms but at the same time to
give expression to the fragility of their ‘lesser ideality’.
The extent, and distinctive nature, of Herz’s incipient realism was also evident in
his consideration of who or what the subjects of international law are. The debate
was enlivened by the arguments of Georges Scelle according to whom only individuals
could be the subjects of law and for whom, hence, the distinction between national
and international law was pointless. Kelsen, although he shared Scelle’s antipathy to
any kind of anthropomorphism, disagreed. Herz accepted neither position, though
he was closer to Kelsen insofar as he believed that it still made sense to talk of states
as subjects of international law. The issue was why, given that he did not agree with
Kelsen’s claim that international law could not directly assign rights and obligations
to individuals and did agree with both Scelle and Kelsen that law ultimately
regulated the behaviour of individuals and nothing else. Herz conceded that the
claim that international law depended on the will of states had a ‘partial sociological
justification’ insofar as both the creation of and adherence to international law was a
matter of the acts and behaviours of the agencies of specific states. But to argue
from this that states could be bound only by their will went too far. There were
simply too many cases where international law had been imposed by small groups of
powerful states. What then justified the personification involved in talking about
states in general as subjects of international law? Herz’s answer lay in a shift of
perspective, focusing on the issue of liability. If one turned to ‘who is affected by the
coercive consequences, a personification of the totality of men forming the “state” is
appropriate in the light of the fact that these coercive consequences can affect,
according to the circumstances, all or any of them without consideration of individual
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behaviour or indeed fault’.23 So long as international law did not fully determine
individual responsibility – bearing in mind here that the effectiveness of law was a key
characteristic of it – we would have to talk about states as subjects of international
law.24 Consideration of power exposed both the fragility of the supposed equality of
states and the vulnerability of those who would suffer the consequences of coercion
exercised in the name of the state.
Taking stock at the end of the 1930s Herz noted the fiction that international law
as a unified system of norms was, to be sure, a necessary working hypothesis for a
judge but for a theorist it too readily became an ideology. The inherent fragility of
international law was evident in the paradox that the norms of international law
depended on the existence of certain kinds of persons, that is states, but that these
persons in turn were dependent for their existence upon ‘relations of power which
prepare for their end at any moment and thereby pull the ground from under the
rules applying to them’.25 He was sceptical about Kelsen’s attempt to construe war
as a sanction, and thus as means of enforcement of the law, suggesting instead that
it is more appropriate to see war as a means of changing law than enforcing it. Yet
there were limits to his scepticism. Historically he thought that the level of fidelity to
treaties was quite remarkable. Moreover, to resort to a flat denial of international law
was little more than subservience to the fetishism of the concept of sovereignty.26 His
conclusion, in 1939, was understandably pessimistic. Speculating on the possibility
that as in the development of national polities one powerful unit might be able to
assert its hegemony over the others, he warned that such a ‘new society’ would be no
less free of relationships of domination and that some would prefer the anarchic
world of today, but ‘We who are contemporaries of the decline of the society of
states amidst the clash of power and doctrines understand how Hobbes, from the
experience of civil war, was ready to hand over all the power of an earthly god to the
Leviathan’.27
National socialist legal theory
Looking back, Herz noted that Kelsen’s theory hardly seemed appropriate to the
Hitler state and the Holocaust. It seemed rather to fall victim to the same suspicion
that it rightly raised against natural law doctrines, namely that of being an ideology.
‘It no longer functioned in extreme situations, to which Carl Schmitt’s theory of the
state of the exception fitted better . . .’28 Herz, however, was not an adherent of
Schmitt’s decisionism. In his pioneering study of Nazi international law he argued
that while Schmitt appeared to be a very sharp thinker, focused on specific situations,
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‘Everything remains floating in uncertainty and vagueness because on the one hand
Schmitt does not want to see race and nationality as the determining factors, but on
the other hand does not dare to make other factors the decisive criteria’.29 Turning
to a wider consideration of Nazi international law, Herz noted the striking contrast
between the social Darwinism of Hitler’s Mein Kampf and of Nazi ideology on the
one hand and the peace speeches of Hitler as Chancellor after 1933 on the other.
Herz also noted that there was a change of tone after the 1936 Party Conference
towards a stronger emphasis on the need for the homogeneity of the states of the
international community, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from this community, a
marked increase in aggressiveness along with the assertion of a right to intervene in
the affairs of other states. This second stage was essentially that of national
consolidation of a Greater Germany which ended with the transition to a third
stage, of open imperialist expansion in March 1939.30 Herz did not follow through
developments into this third stage, though he noted Carl Schmitt’s attempt to adapt
to it.31 He did suggest that it would see the emergence of a more consistent doctrine
and one that fitted in more fully with Nazi ideology as a whole.32 Herz’s assessment
of these doctrines is evidence of his realist scepticism about the autonomy of
international law but also of its importance. The ‘lesser ideality’ of international law
could be used to expose the cynical manipulation of law by power and the attempt
to enlist the normative force of law in the interests of power.
War years
Expropriation and international organisation
Alfons Söllner has rightly stressed that Herz’s study of the Nazi system was one
factor that kept him from adopting a version of the methodological or ontological
primacy of foreign policy as advocated by Hans Morgenthau.33 Herz himself
described his interests as stretching across international politics, comparative politics
and political theory. Something of this was evident in two essays published in the
John Herz and international order 291
29 Herz, Die Völkerrechtlehre des Nationalsozialismus, p. 120. As late as 1992 Herz still thought it
worthwhile to ask ‘Which war situation, which enemy is Schmitt aiming at?’ ‘Looking at Carl Schmitt
from the Vantage Point of the 1990s’, Interpretation, 19 (1992), p. 308. For divergent answers to this
question, see John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), pp. 16, 93, 145; and Peter M.R. Stirk, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Enemy and the
Rhetoric of Anti-Interventionism’, The European Legacy, 8 (2003), pp. 21–36.
30 Herz, Die Völkerrechtlehre des Nationalsozialismus, pp. 42–3, 134–8, 172–3; John H. Herz, ‘The
National Socialist Doctrine of International Law and the Problems of International Organization’,
Political Science Quarterly, 54 (1939), p. 536.
31 In addition to the works already cited, see also Eduard Bristler [John H. Herz], ‘La doctrine national-
socialiste du droit des gens’, Revue internationale de la theorie du droit, 12 (1938), pp. 116–31, and the
wider ranging article, John H. Herz and Joseph Florian, ‘Bolshevist and National Socialist Doctrines
of International Law’, Social Research, 1 (1940), pp. 1–31.
32 On the obstacles to this development see Peter Stirk, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Völkerrechtliche
Grossraumordnung’, in History of Political Thought, 20 (1999), pp. 357–74.
33 Alfons Söllner, ‘Vom Völkerrecht zur Science of International Relations’, in I. Srubar (ed.), Exil,
Wissenschaft, Idenität (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 171.
early 1940s on the phenomenon of expropriation. Both are also marked by a strong
sense of the fragility of the international order. Although Herz retrospectively
described the analysis in one of them as ‘positivistic-Kelsenian’ in style, both set out
the two conflicting approaches to the question of the expropriation of foreign
property: the standard of equal treatment with nationals of the expropriating state
and the standard of civilisation that claimed compensation even when such com-
pensation was not granted to nationals.34 Finding no consensus whatsoever on the
relative merits of the two principles, Herz looked to a ‘practical compromise’ as the
best one might hope for.35 Equally striking is the broader concern about inter-
national trends. Given the date of publication his statement that ‘the very existence
of what used to be called positive international law (a legal order which was based
on equality, or at least an equilibrium of states) is now in the balance’ is hardly
surprising.36 Yet while some comments were clearly related to the war with Germany
others seem to be driven by a concern about broader trends. Thus it was the general
insistence upon ‘absolute “sovereignty” in dealing with rights of foreigners . . . which
leads to complete state autarchy. . . . By trying to do away with one of the few
remaining international procedural institutions, that of diplomatic intervention on
behalf of citizens abroad . . . this attitude effectively weakens the only basis on
which international economic relations in a money society can be erected, the basis
of legal security.’37
Such sentiments were also evident in ‘Power Politics and World Organization’
which opened with a quotation from Guglielmo Ferrero: ‘Power is the supreme
manifestation of the fear that man has created for himself by his efforts to liberate
himself. It is perhaps the most profound and obscure secret of history.’38 Herz later
described how Ferrero, who had taken part in discussions at Kelsen’s home in
Geneva in the 1930s, was one of the cornerstones of his idea of the security
dilemma. The basic insight was already there in Geneva, but Herz could not foresee
the bipolarity of the postwar world let alone the impact of the atomic bomb.39 In
‘Power Politics and World Organization’ he illustrated how this operated through the
balance of power, arguing that its two functions, namely preservation of the
plurality of states and the ability of those states to develop autonomous political
cultures, had been undermined by the competition which was supposed to generate
the balance of power. Thus, in the first place ‘the growing interdependence of the
nations of the world led to the contrary of what “internationalists” had hoped its
result would be; instead of making for peace and world order, it brought a struggle
of powers to dominate the world in order to be secure from the world’.40 In the
second place, the nature of the competition had now reached such a pitch that the
distinction between peace and war, on which the autonomous development of states
had depended, was no longer tenable. This would be true, he predicted, even if there
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were a successful conclusion to the present war. Here Herz seems to have been
influenced by Carl Schmitt’s prophesy of a division of the world between competing
Grossräume, even under the assumption of the defeat of the Third Reich. It would
be, he wrote, ‘a world of “total suspicion”, worse than at any time before’.41
Surveying the possible alternatives to this scenario Herz found only the idea of
collective security, as an adaptation of the balance of power, to be of any plausibility.
Interestingly, he turned to the 1930s which most saw as the archetypal failure of
collective security to illustrate the possibilities and the problems. It had not been the
supposed difficulty in determining the aggressor that was the problem, nor the
supposed advantage to an aggressor involved in a Blitzkrieg. Moreover, he insisted
that the sanctions against Italy in the 1930s could in fact have brought about the
desired result. The prime difficulty was rather the failure to grasp that apparently
distant conflicts and dangers were in fact closer than one thought.42 He expressed
some hope that the present war might have brought some enlightenment in this
regard:
While it took the average Englishman from World War times to 1940 to comprehend that the
airplane had changes his country’s strategic, and therewith political, position, actual
bombardment, coupled with the threat of immediate invasion caused him to learn in a few
days what he had failed to learn in twenty years. Similarly, Pearl Harbour and what may
ensue will have opened the eyes of many an American who failed to realize earlier that
sanctions against a Japan still at the boundary of China proper might have been preferable to
a ‘war of survival.’43
But none of this was certain. Relapse into parochial isolation was still possible. More-
over, there were yet further obstacles. A system of collective security would work
only if it were truly global and violations were infrequent. Were this not the case ‘the
result would be merely the formation of another system of antagonistic blocs and
alliances’.44
Political Realism and Political Idealism
Although Political Realism and Political Idealism was published in 1951, Herz
recalled that the ideas in it were formulated in the late 1930s and early 1940s and the
book itself was largely finished before 1945.45 There are some traces of at least the
early postwar years, including speculation, dated 1946, on the emerging Cold War
divide, and the atomic bomb cast its shadow over Herz’s conclusion.46 Even before
the bomb, Herz’s ideas had taken an apocalyptic tone as in ‘Power Politics and
World Organization’ where he suggested that ‘the “victor over Nature” may turn out
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to have been but another among Nature’s abortive attempts to create a species
capable of survival’.47 Political Realism and Political Idealism was an attempt to
work out a third way between this dark vision and the unwarranted optimism which
stood in such stark contrast to it. Herz began by outlining what he called the
psychological bases of the two types of thought indicated by his title. This was, at
best, partially successful since one of the psychological types was rooted in a social
condition and not an ‘anthropological’ or ‘biological’ one.48 The fear for one’s own
survival arose from uncertainty about the other’s intentions rather than any pre-
sumption about universal desires for domination or aggression. Indeed Herz
repeatedly referred to this point to distinguish the basis of his ‘realism’ from that of
Morgenthau’s realism.49 The second psychological basis of human behaviour was
pity or compassion.50 The conflict between the two issued in a sense of guilt which
could in turn be suppressed, acted on, albeit only at the expense of self-abnegation
or withdrawal from the world, or could intermittently intervene in patterns of
behaviour marked by concern for survival. The range of behaviour already indicates
the rather limited explanatory power of this psychological basis. But even the more
robust socially-based security dilemma allowed for a striking range of evaluations.
This was evident when Herz turned to the definition of political realism:
For ‘Political Realism’, in our sense, characterizes that type of political thought which in one
form or another, sometimes not fully and at other times in an exaggerated manner, recognizes
and takes into consideration the implications for political life of those security and power
factors which...are inherent in human society. Even if such thought does not stop at pure
analysis and description, but either glorifies the phenomena as ideal or tries to find ‘rational’
solutions of the problems produced by them, it is expressive of realism in our sense so long as
it recognizes the obstacles which the basic phenomena observed put in the way of any
‘rational’ solution.51
Herz initially presented political idealism, by contrast, as simply that type of
thought which did not recognise such limits. Later on, however, he specified that he
meant, for example, that type of thought that, even if it recognised that history had
been driven by the considerations outlined by political realism, presumed that other
considerations could become the basis of human behaviour.52 Later on still, Herz
specified that political idealism included those ‘rationalistic’ philosophies that
presumed that reason was already operative ‘“in” the facts’ and whose idealism
consisted in a denial of the ‘irrationality’ of the world.53
These two types of political idealism had rather different implications. The first
type is best represented by Herz’s account of the French revolutionaries or the
Russian Bolsheviks. In the case of the former, idealism meant a war of liberation,
construed as a final war which allowed for no neutrality. It was a war that,
confronted with the frustrating reality of occupation and resistance, tipped over into
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a nationalistic Realpolitik.54 The historical function of political idealism of this type
‘has been to criticize, attack and destroy rather than to be the foundation of new
structure’.55 Political idealism of the second type was rather different, though Herz
did not make this explicitly clear. Here his criticism of Kelsen can serve as an
example: ‘This tendency to rationalize is illustrated by Kelsen’s attempt to interpret
wars so that in each case force is represented as illegal violence on the one side and
self-defense or retribution on the other’.56 The error here lies less in the utopian
attempt to realise the unrealisable and more in a denial of the ‘irrationality’ of
international life.
It is clear that Herz could not understand himself as a realist without qualific-
ation, for realism as he defined it was compatible with a veneration of power that he
never indulged in. Moreover, Herz’s realism was pervaded by a sense of the con-
tingency and irrationality of the international world that is difficult to reconcile with
the presumption that states are rational actors, which is so commonly held to be a
defining element of realism as a doctrine, whether by offensive realism, defensive
realism or many of their critics. Nor is his realism easy to reconcile with the
assumption that the international system is like a market that will guarantee rational
behaviour if only by punishing those who disobey its dictates.57 Herz deployed the
market analogy sparingly and only in order to help explain the predominance of
considerations of power, not as any kind of guarantee that reason would prevail.58
Herz’s position was that of a realist insofar as he believed in the persistence of the
security dilemma, to which one should add a sense of contingency or irrationality
which set limits to the realm of law. To that extent the fragility of the legal order
evident in his early writings still formed part of his world view. Herz defined his own
position as that of a ‘realist liberalism’ that entailed an explicit value choice. It was
indicative of the European origins of his approach that he saw the major challenge
to this value choice less in the problem of ethical relativism than in the tradition of
Kulturkritik that established a negative correlation between liberalism and cultural
value.59 It was a realism that was still compatible with a vision of collective security,
understood as a modified balance of power. Despite his criticism of Kelsen’s
legalism it was a system of collective security in which legal provisions played a
crucial role: ‘The basic elements of the system thus are: (a) recognition of a state’s
legal right to existence, and (b) definition of what constitutes an infringement of this
right (that is, the legal definition of aggression).’60 As in his earlier observations,
however, the crucial factor was whether or not states could recognise the general
interest in such a system and whether they had the political will to act on that
recognition. Yet the prospects were not promising. The concentration of political
power both domestically and internationally, and the reach of that power, had grown
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considerably. This meant that it was no longer ‘possible for those who are persecuted
or discriminated against, whom certain developments have rendered “superfluous”,
or who have become weary of society or a way of life, to escape into the “unknown”
parts of the world, either the unknown within the area of their society . . . or, above
all, into foreign lands. . . .’61 Herz held out little hope for a more democratic inter-
national order, that was contradicted by the structure of the United Nations. More
likely was the emergence of a bipolar world characterised by ideological division and
new weapons of destruction.62 In this context the idea of collective security could
degenerate into ‘mere ideology and subterfuge in order to provide bloc-building with
a semblance of legality.’63
The Cold War world
Germany and denazification
Herz had watched denazification from relatively close quarters, and had been
involved in the interrogation of the Nazi Minister of the Interior, Frick. The ‘Fiasco
of Denazification in Germany’ as he put it in a 1948 article, was striking both in
terms what he saw as a misguided denazification policy and in terms of German
failure to confront the recent past. In this he shared the views of his colleagues in
the Office of Strategic Services, most notably Otto Kirchheimer.64 There was a tone
of bitterness, to put it mildly, in an observation in a footnote: ‘[as] if German
assumption of responsibility for meting out retribution for crimes committed by
Germans would not have meant a more impressive assumption of sovereignty than
all the clamouring for “occupation statutes” and similar Allied concessions!’65 Herz
drew two other broad conclusions from the Third Reich. One was that the level of
compliance with the regime, even in relation to its criminality, raised broader questions
about the extent to which populations in non-totalitarian societies were likely to
protest against the deployment of nuclear weapons.66 The second again drew a
connection between the prospect of nuclear war and the Third Reich:
The latter atrocity [the Holocaust] appeared so utterly depraved because it denied to the
victim that which international ‘morality’ still considered then a minimum condition for the
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justification of killing: a minimum chance to survive in the armed forces or at home, through
defensive or protective actions. Exactly this, however, is denied the victims of the bombs, that
is, all of us, as it was denied the victims of Hitler’s death camps. And thus our traditional
standards and attitudes can no longer measure up to man’s present potentialities.67
International Politics in the Atomic Age
International Politics in the Atomic Age and the associated articles were motivated by
a sense of the ‘newness’ and ‘indeterminateness’ of the new age brought about by
the historically contingent association of bipolarity and the emergence of nuclear
weapons.68 In order to make clear the significance of the change Herz set out his
understanding of the basis of the modern state system. Typically, he began with a
paradox, that is the characterisation of the system as in some sense a community or
society and its characterisation as anarchic. He promptly argued that both character-
istics were rooted in the existence of state’s ‘impenetrability’, ‘impermeability, or
‘territoriality’. In a clear reformulation of his ideas of the 1930s he specified that this
‘territoriality’ formed the ‘“existential” basis’ for the jurisdiction claimed by the
sovereign state. Territoriality was guaranteed by the ‘hard shell’ that provided the
‘impenetrability’.69 The insight into this development he ascribed to Leibniz, accord-
ing to whom the defensibility of a state, and hence a minimum territorial size, were
the basic condition for the existence of sovereignty.70 The sovereign was he who ‘had
the power to constrain his subjects while not being so constrainable by superior
power. Thus the decisive criterion of sovereignty was the actual, that is, in the final
resort, the military, control of territory, the pacification of one’s “estates” by one’s
own military power.’71 It was consistent with this that international law, apart that is
from treaty based law, had dealt with the ‘delimitation of countries’ jurisdictions’.72
Although Herz cited Morgenthau in support, it was, as he later indicated, Kelsen
who stood behind this emphasis upon jurisdiction.73
Territoriality defined the ‘structure’ of the modern state system but the ‘system’
was dependent upon other factors, most notably and obviously the balance of
power. That in turn was not a merely mechanical process but was shaped by a sense
of community, at least for the states of Europe.74 There is no need to consider this as
an alien element in Herz’s realism in the way that Robert Jervis is obliged to concede
that the ‘basis and forms of cooperation after the Napoleonic Wars may have rested
on conceptions of common interests and shared responsibilities that are alien to
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realism. . . .’75 There is no need to do so because the basis of Herz’s realism is the
recognition of a social condition, the security dilemma, and not a certain conception
of agency which excludes such conceptions on principle.
As usual in Herz’s work the limits and precariousness of the international order
were not far away. Beyond the ‘amity lines’ the restraint practised in Europe was
abandoned.76 Within Europe, first the principle of legitimacy and then that of self-
determination contributed to the ‘remarkable stability of the statehood of nations
during this period’.77 As in Political Realism and Political Idealism Herz interpreted
collective security as a modification of the balance of power intended to defend the
principle of territoriality. Hence the League of Nations, true to this structural
principle, had taken into account the defensibility of states seeking membership.
Significantly the new United Nations did not.78 That was indicative of a general
trend. Collective security had been an option before the Second World War but it
had not been grasped. The idea of indivisibility of peace underlying collective
security was now grasped but collective security was no longer an option. It had
been undermined by bipolarity, the associated ideological division and the destructive-
ness of nuclear power.79
Bipolarity had its own principle of territoriality. ‘Bipolar territoriality’ was
symbolised by the bases or garrisons which the two superpowers established on the
territory of their allies or satellites.80 It was an inherently more ‘precarious’ and
‘rigid’ balance because no others could significantly affect it. The balance, such as it
was, was ‘predetermined’. The old concepts had to be adapted to make sense of this
new phenomenon but the concept of territoriality still made sense in the context of
bipolarity alone. But this was not true of the impact of nuclear weapons. Although
economic blockade, ideological penetration and air warfare had all heralded the
cracking of the ‘hard shell’, nuclear weapons simply by-passed it. Herz’s conclusion
was that ‘Today, with impermeability gone, insecurity is all pervading’.81 It was
notable, however, that the chronology of the transition was qualified in the next
sentence: ‘Even in the absence of actual hostilities, therefore, “peace” in the classical
sense can no longer be said to prevail; rather we live in that continual uncertainty
that lies between “war” and “peace” and that already existed in the period between
the two world wars’.82 This helps to explain why the themes of suspicion and
uncertainty predate the atomic age that Herz then used to focus those sentiments.
The idea of inhabiting a precarious no-man’s land between war and peace had
occurred to others too, including Carl Schmitt, though he used it for radically
different purposes.83 It is, as Herz has emphasised recently, all too relevant today.84
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At this point it is worth making two general points about the security dilemma
and the epochal nature of the changes that Herz believed he was witnessing that
bring out the distinctiveness of his realism compared with some modern variants. As
noted above, Mearsheimer claims that offensive realism can be derived from Herz’s
conception of the security dilemma. Yet this is true only if one strips the dilemma
out of the security dilemma. As Snyder, and earlier Glaser, have argued this is
exactly what Mearsheimer does.85 Snyder puts this well: ‘Mearsheimer does allow
that states do not know each other’s intentions for sure, but he also says that they
“are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states” . . .
If all are revisionist and believe (correctly) that others are too, it is hard to see any
“dilemma”.’86 It is indeed, and the same underlying presumption of rationality is
evident in Mearsheimer’s attempt to deflect Glaser’s criticism, in part by mobilising
and misinterpreting Herz. According to Mearsheimer given Glaser’s interpretation
of the security dilemma ‘hardly any security competition should ensue among
rational states, because it would be fruitless, maybe even counterproductive’.87 In the
case of the atomic age Herz had considered this ‘logic’, namely that security could
only be guaranteed by eliminating the competitor at the price of suicide. Herz wrote
that the only means of attaining the end of security ‘precludes the end’, only to
promptly add ‘Logical preclusion, of course, offers no guarantee against actual
resort to all-out war in disregard of rationality’.88
Second, Herz interpreted the advent of atomic weapons as something that had a
decisive impact upon the structural principle of the international order, namely
‘territoriality’.89 It is true that bipolarity and nuclear weapons have been widely
accepted as momentous transitions in the international order. Indeed Jervis invokes
recognition of their significance as evidence of realism’s ability to respond to ‘the
possibilities for “epochal” change’.90 Herz’s realism did precisely that but it is not clear
that the same can be said of some other exponents of realism. Thus Mearsheimer
claims that ‘During the Cold War . . . the level of fear between the superpowers
probably would have been substantially greater if nuclear weapons had not been
invented.’91 A common evaluation can be found in Jervis’s seminal article on the
security dilemma. There he wrote of the introduction of nuclear weapons: ‘the result is
the equivalent of the primacy of defence’.92 Lynn-Jones more cautiously summarises
the majority opinion amongst offence-defence theorists to the effect that the ‘nuclear
revolution has significantly shifted the offense-defense balance toward defense.’93
Nuclear weapons here are significant, even revolutionary, but they are not seen, as they
were by Herz, as something that fundamentally challenged the structural principles of
the international order. It is this difference that marks out Herz’s kind of realism.
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The nation-state, reason and interests
The fate of the nation-state
This readiness to reconsider the basic principles of the international order, based on
an underlying sense of the precariousness and fragility of that order, was evident in
Herz’s comments on the fate of the nation-state more generally. In International
Politics in the Atomic Age, however, he wrote that there was no consensus on what
counted as statehood at all. The two blocs adopted different criteria for recognising
‘states’. Not even control of territory was sufficient, or necessary, according to the
competing ideological visions. Similarly ‘with the evanescence of clear-cut inter-
national units and unambiguous frontiers the possibility of applying criteria of
“violation of territorial integrity” has vanished too’.94 Writing at the end of the
1950s he noted that the potential flashpoints, Korea, Berlin, Indo-China, all involved
contested boundaries and states. Then and later Herz’s recommendation was that
each side should respect the de facto demarcation line, disregard the absence of any
prospect of agreement on the legal status of these entities but recognise that each
side was committed by its value system to retaining control of its ‘states’.95 The
broader issue of the fate of the territorial state remained, however, a recurrent
concern. In ‘The Territorial State Revisited’, published in 1968, Herz looked back on
his essay on the ‘Rise and Demise of the Territorial State’ which he said had been
somewhat rash. He pointed to a variety of factors suggesting a ‘new territoriality’,
including the declining significance of bases with the development of ICBMs.96 Yet
his conclusion suggests that the new territoriality was far from assured: ‘the pessi-
mistic conclusion that it is almost too late for the development of “new territoriality”
seems realistically, to impose itself ’ and the alternative to this new territoriality was
not supranationalism but ‘genuine, raw chaos’.97 That suggestion of raw chaos was
evident in his comments on the proliferation of states which he described as ‘often
synthetic and nonviable units’.98 The ‘paradox’ of the discrepancy between their
legal equality with the large, established states and the actual distribution of power
had reached ‘fantastic proportions’.99 A decade later Herz was no more optimistic.
In many of the new, self-determining nations, the ‘self ’ at stake was problematic at
best.100 Their plight was aggravated by the population explosion that lead to another
‘paradox’, namely that while rural populations had been largely self-sufficient, the
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population explosion and urbanisation made them dependent on the state. In the
West this welfare function had served to legitimise the state but ‘most Third World
countries omit this legitimizing phase, leaping from premodern stages to the
polarization of impoverished and super-rich elites’.101
Herz had become a self-avowed realist, content to emphasise that his position was
compatible with that of Kenneth Waltz.102 He took the ‘basic units’ of international
politics to be states. Yet he did not presume that the existence or nature of these
units was unproblematic. Even his earlier work was concerned with problems of
state succession, with states as the subjects and creators of international law in a
system which threatened them with extinction. He had seen the sovereign equality of
states used as a screen behind which lay the unlimited ambition of Nazi Germany.
His model of the territorial state was written from the perspective of the demise of
the territorial state. His later work dealt with divided states and non-viable states
and held out the prospect of ‘genuine raw chaos’. The basic insights behind all this
lay in the Europe of the 1930s.
Rationality in an uncertain world
In International Politics in the Atomic Age Herz gave priority to ‘structures’ and
‘system’ over motives and actions of statesmen.103 That was consistent with the way
his realism was based on a social condition. Yet, as indicated above, the problems of
acting rationally in an irrational world also formed part of his conception of
realism. Those problems were exacerbated both by the logic of nuclear deterrence
and by broader processes of social ‘acceleration’.104 Both came together in the
novelty of a ‘world politics’ characterised by a ‘universality of information and
discourse, universalization of concern, and ubiquitousness of power and weapons’.105
Yet statesmen responded to this, as in the case of the debate about a multilateral
force in NATO in the 1960s, with a greater centralisation of control in the interest of
being able to react with speed. In reality, however, even this offered little sense of
certainty. The logic of deterrence had become dependent upon a ‘complicated
process of mutual mind reading’.106 Herz was sceptical about radical attempts to
escape from this problem. Adherents of mutual deterrence and unilateral dis-
armament were both ‘in a sense eighteenth century optimists: the former because
they put all stock in rational behaviour, the latter because they must make every-
thing dependent on “fair play”’.107 Herz showed little more enthusiasm for the
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efforts of his academic colleagues to discern order and predictability in the world by
recourse to statistical analyses of, for example, whether ‘aggressors’ were more or
less likely to ‘win’ wars in one period rather than another. Failure to take into
account the historical and cultural dimensions meant that they were simply
meaningless.108
The same sensitivity to historical and cultural context made Herz suspicious of
the resort to analogies with the appeasement of the 1930s and especially the
invocation of the image of Munich. Herz, who prided himself on his study of Nazi
theories of international law, had no sympathy with Chamberlain and company.
However, he saw the rhetoric of appeasement, deployed on all sides in the Cold War,
as counterproductive, pushing leaders on both sides to portray any compromise as a
victory in order to escape the accusation from domestic critics or others of having
succumbed to a policy of appeasement. In the 1960s, in the wake of the Cuban
missile crisis, Herz was concerned not only to illustrate the vicious circle this led to
but also the sheer inapplicability of the analogy: ‘Preventive war, which in the 1930s
might actually have prevented the subsequent worldwide war, today would be truly
suicidal.’109
The importance of perception and image were taken up more broadly by Herz in
a significant modification of his position in the 1950s.110 Here not only the
importance of analogies like Munich and appeasement were invoked, but also the
significance of metaphor, symbols and the maintenance of image. This was now
applied quite widely to basic perceptions of the nature of international politics. In
Herz’s words, ‘To the critical mind, the world of international relations, with its
systems and actors, its groupings and conflicts, results from the perceptual and
conceptual structures that we, observers or actors, bestow on the world’.111 He was
willing to apply this to his earlier account of the balance of power. Whether this had
in fact existed now appeared contingent. What appeared to be a balance of power,
say to English statesmen, appeared to others as a struggle for hegemony in which
any balance of power was a transient interlude. Similar considerations applied to the
concept of power itself and the idea of interests of states. All were filtered through
the perceptual and conceptual bestowal of meaning. Yet Herz had not taken flight
into pure conceptual relativism. At some point the greater or lesser discrepancy
between perceived world and reality would be exposed, even if only by the
experience of war.112
That Herz had taken this ‘subjective’ turn is perhaps not altogether surprising.
From the beginning he had known that the legal order at least was constructed out
of fictive elements but he had looked for the material substratum underlying them.
That was true of the greatest fiction of them all, the state. Now, however, he was
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beginning to redress the balance. Whichever trajectory is right, the search for the
material substratum or the moment of perceptual and conceptual construction,
Herz’s move first, and predominantly, in one direction and then in another suggests
an unwillingness to take either as unproblematic. Herz’s insight into the fictive
nature of the state and the transient, fragile and intersubjective international order
stands in stark contrast to the assumption of contemporary realism that the state
and the international order are durable and persistent. It is notably in this context
that Herz himself suggested that the incompatibility of such views with the
dominant ‘scientific’ pretensions of the discipline in America at the time lay behind
the rejection of an English language version of the article in which they were most
forcefully expressed.113 These views also place him in proximity to constructivism.
There are of course limits to such analogies and much depends on the variety of
constructivism at stake. The point is simply that there is no principled barrier
between Herz’s kind of realism and constructivism.114
Universal interests
Another striking contrast between the kind of realism defended by self-professed
American realists in the Review of International Studies and Herz lies in the way that
from the end of the 1930s Herz had invoked some conception of a common interest
in peace which was, or should have been, of evident concern regardless of the
apparent distance from the threat. In International Politics in the Atomic Age he had
reformulated that as a universal interest in survival. Much later, when Richard
Ashley ascribed a defence of moral principles to him, Herz objected that he had
‘pleaded for substituting enlightened, long-range interest for the immediate parochial
one. In other words universalism, as I conceive it, is based on universal interests,
such as global survival interests, not on unselfish moral principle.’115 His preference
for the language of interests need not be taken as evidence of moral indifference or
insensitivity. The choice of phrase in many essays and books and the attempt to
formulate some psychological type on the basis of a sentiment of pity or compassion
suggest the contrary. But moral constraint had not fared well when confronted with
the pursuit of the national interest. Moreover, in the 1970s he concluded that ‘We
have underestimated society’s (all societies’) capacity for aggression, greed, cowardice,
and human incapacity to be impressed, morally or even for reasons of mere survival,
by the excesses of totalitarian regimes.’116 That was an especially bleak observation
even for Herz but it symbolised part of the problem.
The other part of the problem was Herz’s own self-professed value relativism
which had attracted him to Kelsen back in the 1930s. Where there was a clear threat
to the survival of the species, however, there seemed to be an alternative way
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forward: ‘when certain values become so overwhelmingly important that their
nonrecognition appears “absurd” to practically everybody, they can be considered as
“certain”’.117 For Herz this was true of the threat posed by atomic weapons but also
of the growth of the global population, ecological damage and prospective
exhaustion of finite resources.118 The difficulty was that any salvation could come
only through the mediation of nation-states.
Conclusion
When Richard Little explored the diverse development of modern American realism
and the English School from a common background in classical realism he omitted
to make one point, perhaps because he considered it too obvious though other
reasons may have been at work. The point is well-known: it is the irony that a self-
consciously American understanding of realism originated in the ideas of European
scholars, especially central-European scholars, one of whom was John Herz.
Stressing the European heritage may not sit comfortably with the contrast between
American realism and the English School, though that is a point that cannot be
taken up here.
More significant here is the point that Little does make very forcefully, namely
that the classical heritage, as exemplified by Morgenthau, was narrowed as it was
developed and refined. Herz played a smaller, but important role in that process. He
did not write a textbook of the status of Politics Among Nations and by his own
account the diversity of his interests, in comparative government as well as inter-
national relations theory, limited his impact in the latter. Nevertheless, he did
contribute to the formation of a realist approach, he was a pioneering figure in
terms of identifying the ‘security dilemma’ and his International Politics in the
Atomic Age was an influential study that earned him the epithet ‘hard shell-Herz’.119
It was indicative of the underlying tension between Herz and the developing
academic culture of his adopted homeland that he opened the Preface to Inter-
national Politics in the Atomic Age with the assertion that ‘[t]his is an old-fashioned
kind of book’.120 The feeling of not being in step clearly had nothing to do with the
culture clash experienced by the newly arrived. By the time he wrote the Preface he
had been in America just over twenty years, had an established academic position
and had come to understand himself as an ‘emigrant’ not an ‘exile’.121
What was at issue here was the development of an approach to IR theory to
which Herz, the self-avowed realist, contributed but which took on a form that was
ultimately inconsistent with Herz’s world view. That can be seen by contrasting
Herz’s approach with Little’s contenders in the Review of International Studies. As
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Little noted there is some divergence in the self-understanding of avowed American
realists.122 There are however key assertions with which Herz’s work is clearly
compatible: that ‘Realism is designed to understand relations and interactions
between states’;123 that realists share a ‘pessimism about the salience of norms in
international relations’;124 that realism ‘focuses on power and security drives as
primary causal forces in global politics.’125 Yet there is also a set of common
underlying assumptions that begin to indicate the difference between Herz and these
realists: that, as Little puts it, ‘anarchy is a robust structure that does not need to be
explained’;126 that an ‘age-old pattern . . . reinforces the profound explanatory
strength of a power-driven approach to world politics’;127 that transitions as
apparently significant as the end of the Cold War do not call into question the
concepts and explanatory force of American realism;128 that while realists ‘often
have an ethical agenda . . . their ethical agenda is not derived from their theory of
international politics’.129
What is evident in the latter set of statements is a sense of the persistence and
durability of the international world and the theory that explains it. Theory is, of
course, not seen as static. The fundamental concepts remain the same but refinement
is possible and greater analytical rigour and explanatory power are held out as the
virtues of American realism. It is here that the gap between Herz and this kind of
realism really opens up. It can be illustrated by the almost casual way in which
Copeland invokes Hitler’s ‘takeovers of Austria and the Sudetenland’ as ‘but one
example’ of the way in which states ‘cheat’ by manipulating international norms.130
As explained above, Herz wrote at length on National Socialist international law,
and exposed its manipulation of such norms, but not as ‘but one example’ of
anything. What Herz was warning was that this state was utterly different and, later,
that the Munich analogy was dangerous in a changed world. That leads on to a
broader point made in the ‘Introduction’ to International Politics in the Atomic Age:
It will be the main thesis of this study that some of the factors which underlay the ‘modern
state system’ . . . and which determined rather stably its structure and relationships have now,
in our century and even within the lifetime of many of us, undergone such fundamental
changes that the structure of international relations is different, or in the process of becoming
different, and can no longer be interpreted exclusively in traditional terms.131
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Herz was motivated by a sense of the fragility of the international order and by the
challenge this posed to the basic concepts of IR theory. That sentiment was already
evident before Herz became a self-avowed ‘realist’. It can be explained in part simply
by the turbulence of the short twentieth century but of course not all who lived
through part at least of that century drew the same conclusions that Herz did.
However, a sense of the dramatic challenge to the international order, its basic units
and principles, was a common European response, even amongst those, like Carl
Schmitt, whom Herz clearly opposed.132
Herz’s scepticism about the application of game theories, simulation and computers
as well, more broadly, of quantitative techniques, is quite consistent with this sense
of the fragility, dynamism and unpredictability of the international order. Indeed, it
is arguable that the enhanced predictability promised by American realism ultimately
strips the dilemma out of the security dilemma. Herz took the dilemma seriously but
this did not reduce him to a passive fatalism. He even differed from this kind of
American realism in developing an ethical stance that was derived from his
understanding of international politics. This point should not be pushed too far. He
cannot be retrospectively claimed for the English School. Herz was a realist. He can
be counted amongst those described by Jonathon Haslam as ‘sensitive and
penetrating, in some cases utopian, minds that over-reacted to dramatic, unheralded
and therefore unexpected outbursts of violence and their consequences’.133 This
serves as a better description of Herz than it does of the kind of American realism
recently advanced in the Review of International Studies. Herz is worth re-reading
because of his role in the formation of American realism but also because of the
tension that emerged between that realism and Herz’s kind of realism.134 He is also
worth re-reading by those who believe that they are confronted by ‘dramatic,
unheralded and therefore unexpected outbursts of violence and their consequences’,
even if they do not see themselves as utopians and have no wish to over-react.
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